On 15 September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America shook the world by announcing a new trilateral security arrangement collectively known as AUKUS. Τhis configuration, following the recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan, has effectuated a new turn of tectonic changes and reveals a lot about the current global strategic context. The announcement of the AUKUS deal undeniably generated mixed reactions; for the majority of Asian countries it represents a well-protected anchorage against an adventurous China and for the European Union (and especially France) it was perceived as a “stab in the back”. This perception is not only based on the traditionally close politico-military congruence between Paris and Washington, but also on the fact that France was excluded from the US strategic considerations in the Indo-Pacific despite its staunch commitment towards the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the political turmoil that followed in the wake of the agreement, AUKUS showcases both a new paradigm shift in international security by connoting a return to the geopolitics of the Anglosphere (reaffirming the ever-changing nature of the transatlantic relations), and a new opportunity to reinvigorate the debate on the EU´s strategic autonomy and international positioning.
Balancing between allies and interests: An anatomy of the AUKUS deal
The advent of AUKUS effectively scuttled and cancelled the 66 billion USD submarine contract between Australia and the French defense manufacturer Naval Group in 2016, foreseeing the supply of a new fleet of diesel electric Barracuda-class submarines to Canberra. Instead, AUKUS will enable the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to acquire eight nuclear-powered – but conventionally armed – submarines (SSNs) by 2040, with the intention to conduct their construction phase in Adelaide. However, the fact that nuclear technology-sharing has gained considerable traction from international media outlets does not rule out the fact that AUKUS opens new areas of enhanced military cooperation on both the development of cyber capabilities (e.g., artificial intelligence, quantum computing) and their respective defense industrial bases. The latest joint statement by Prime Ministers Scott Morrison and Boris Johnson and President Joe Biden suggests that over the next 18 months, the trilateral format will “seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability” by determining whether American or British submarines will be the basis for the Australian construction.
The recently-formed alliance seems bound to lead to further political and military turbulence both in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. At the political level, AUKUS not only reaffirms the previous US strategy coined by Obama as “Pivot to Asia”, but also confronts China as a systemic rival. Therefore, AUKUS complements the existing Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between USA, Australia, Japan and India, transcending its limitations vis-à-vis China. Moreover AUKUS represents a new layer in the relations between Washington and Canberra beyond their cooperation in other collective security arrangements such as the Five-Eyes, and their tripartite alliance with New Zealand (ANZUS). Nevertheless the US foreign policy endangers its close allies by inevitably drawing them deep into a zero-sum game with China.
At the military level, the provision of SSNs will bolster the naval and missile capabilities of Australia, although risking a fall into the so-called “Thucydides Trap” by setting a precedent in the proliferation of strategic equipment, in turn triggering a draining and profligate nuclear arms race in the region. A second risk pertains to the fact that rendering these vessels operational entails a time-consuming and costly scheme that will extend beyond 2040, leaving Australia with few options against potential Chinese aggression. Consequently, there still remains a question as to why Australians hastily canceled their 6-year contract with France - which would deliver the first submarine in 2030 - instead opting for a different naval component with late delivery (and perhaps invoking the leasing of a US submarine in the interregnum) and being tasked to refurbish their six Collins-class submarines that were slated for decommission. The next months will shed light on whether the nature of the deal will focus on technology-sharing or a mere arms sale.
“It Takes Three to Tango”: Why was France snubbed?
The first reaction of Paris following the announcement of the AUKUS agreement was associated with acute discontent, to the point that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian referred to “lies”, “duplicity” and “major breach of trust”. The political fallout saw Paris recalling its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra and cancelling the scheduled Franco-British defense summit. On September 22nd a phone call between Presidents Macron and Biden took place, where the US President attempted to sooth the tensions by admitting that “the situation would have benefitted from open consultations among allies on matters of strategic interest to France and our European partners". Indeed, the G7 Summit in Cornwall would have been the most appropriate place for consultations. In this regard, France can still recuperate from the loss of its biggest arms export contract (although French companies would only receive a small fraction of the overall amount), however its trust will continue to be challenged by the secrecy with which it was faced.
Contrary to the Australian calculus that was primarily moved by the shifting geopolitical configurations, the US foreign policy under Biden is driven by sheer pragmatism and blunt realism with no sentimental attachments to traditional alliances, as indicated by its latest overtures (e.g., Afghanistan, AUKUS). The latter’s approach can be characterized as myopic at best, disregarding a committed power in the Indo-Pacific and a staunch supporter of the concept within the EU. Not only was France the first European country to adopt its own national Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018, but it also holds a significant amount of its Overseas territory in the region (e.g., Mayotte, La Réunion, New Caledonia, French Polynesia) covering more than 90% of its EEZ and hosting around 1.5 million people. For this reason Paris has stepped up its military presence with 8.000 stationed personnel, and led the recent QUAD naval exercise – coined La Pérouse. Taken together, these factors not only prove that Paris has tangible sovereign interests in the region, but also that its presence is based on a long-lasting commitment that will not collapse easily.
AUKUS is the eye-opener that EU needs
The fact that AUKUS was announced on the day that the EU adopted its own EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific demonstrates a lack of regard for the latter, and was met with strong words by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Despite the reverberations of the UK’s “Global Britain” concept, the EU has by far more areas of common interest with the US (e.g., AI, climate change) in which they can develop concerted actions against China.
By shoving aside France, this cooperation seem less likely, although it does not mean disengagement from the Indo-Pacific, especially in anticipation of the upcoming French presidency in the Council of EU in January 2022, which should direct its focus towards India and other Asian states that want to avoid being dragged into military overtures. While the EU could follow a tougher stance and torpedo the ongoing negotiations for the EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the EU should use AUKUS as a stepping-stone to accelerate the path towards European strategic autonomy. The achievement of the latter will reduce dependence to Washington, reinforce the European footing and allow for complementary responses in the Indo-Pacific. After all, progressing the European project never meant a one-off decoupling from transatlantic cooperation.
Comments