The Colombia-Venezuela border is one of the most volatile and insecure regions in Latin America. On one side, a raging humanitarian crisis unfolds caused by economic mismanagement by the Maduro regime. The widespread poverty and malnutrition, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing health crisis, has triggered 5.4 million people to flee abroad - the second largest displacement in the world behind the Syrian crisis. On the other side, Colombia has suffered from 60 years of protracted internal conflict, resulting in the highest number of internally displaced people in the world at 7.7 million. There is continued widespread violence perpetrated by guerrillas, gangs, and armed groups involved in illicit trade, particularly in drug trafficking, gold, and oil.
As a hub for illegal activity featuring an absence of state capacity and fragile sovereignty, violence has been common along the 2,200km long border for decades. As Bram Ebus –border expert for the International Crisis Group (ICG)– highlights, refugees and contraband flow from Venezuela to Colombia – drugs and men with guns flow the other way. Following the 2016 Colombian peace deal and the demobilisation of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), struggles have intensified in recent years as a vacuum of power has catalysed the expansion of new armed groups in the borderland’s region, who compete for territory and control. The COVID-19 pandemic has further worsened the situation, with border closures driving the expansion of illicit trade and smuggling. The result? An escalating humanitarian crisis in the border region.
What is happening in the border region of Venezuela and Colombia?
For decades, the Venezuelan government has allowed Colombian guerrilla forces and non-state actors to operate on the Venezuelan side of the border, profiting from their illicit activities. As a result of Colombian forces cracking down on non-state armed groups’ operations in Colombia, former FARC dissidents and the ELN (National Liberation Army) as well as other Colombian armed groups are penetrating ever further into the Venezuelan jungle, profiting from tacit agreements with the Venezuelan state. They use the state as a drug trafficking corridor from Colombia and are capitalising on the booming illicit economy of gold mining in Amazonas State, which has become a crucial financing mechanism for them. Whilst Colombian armed groups often operate alongside Venezuelan officials, these relations are highly fragile and volatile, and often spark conflict over money and territory.
In 2019, Venezuela severed diplomatic ties with Colombia, in retaliation to the latter's recognition of the self-proclaimed interim president Juan Guaido and support for his efforts to bring humanitarian aid to the crisis-ravaged country. From February to June 2019 the Maduro government blockaded border crossings to prevent aid from reaching Venezuelans, fearing this move was a pretext for a US military invasion. From March 2020, the border has been closed to curb the COVID-19 pandemic. These compounding factors have resulted in more violence than ever before.
Tensions culminated in March 2021, when the Venezuelan military launched a military offensive against a faction of the FARC dissidents, known as the 10th Front. This centred on the border region around La Victoria in Apure state. The Venezuelan military deployed aircraft and special police forces to support the offensive. Human Rights Watch has said there is evidence that suggests the Venezuelan military committed extrajudicial killings, beatings, and arbitrary detention in the area. The skirmishes triggered the displacement of 6,000 people in Apure state to the Colombian town of Arauquita. Whilst the precise causes of the clashes are unknown, experts believe they arose over tensions pertaining to the distribution of illicit revenues from narco-trafficking, and clashes over territorial control.
The increasing border tensions have sparked fierce debate between the two governments, igniting fears of broader military conflict as Caracas and Bogotá see the border as an inter-state threat. The Colombian President Iván Duque accuses the Maduro “dictatorship” of posing a “constant threat to democracy in the region” by supporting armed groups for profit to attack Colombia, and of using selective response to “control drug trafficking”’ in certain areas. Meanwhile, Maduro asserts Duque “is up to his neck in this plan” to escalate violence between armed groups and the Venezuelan military as part of a Colombian-US campaign to create conditions to justify an imperialist intervention. Whilst both claims seem to be backed by little evidence, this war or words is creating heightened political tensions between the two states.
Venezuelan Military patrol the Colombia-Venezuela border on the Aruaca River, March 28, 2021.
Photograph by: Luisa Gonzalez/Reuters. Available here.
How tensions affect indigenous groups and refugees in the borderlands
In Venezuela, and particularly in the states of Amazonas and Apure, the increasing presence of armed groups such as the FARC, ELN, local crime ring Los Puntilleros del Vichada, and the paramilitary successor group Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia has multiple consequences for the local indigenous populations. Often, in these immensely isolated regions, guerrilla groups win the support of local populations by acting as shadow governments and providing necessary services. For example, armed groups often try to buy the support of local communities by paying schoolteachers and transporting the sick to hospitals. Moreover, as Ebus explains, the ELN is attempting to win over the hearts and minds of the people by blocking violent mining gangs from entering the state of Amazonas. As a result, some locals in Puerto Ayacucho –the state capital– even approve of the ELN for bringing down local crime rates.
However, often, non-state armed groups use violence and extortion to gain territorial control. They may charge fees at strategic checkpoints, buy the influence of local indigenous leaders, pay for local collaborators (US$8 per day), and coerce indigenous leaders into cooperating and occupying their land, with negative consequences if they refuse. The vast expansion of illegal gold mining on the Venezuelan side of the border also causes widespread environmental degradation in the form of mercury pollution and deforestation, and the loss of indigenous lands angers local populations. The presence of armed groups therefore creates vast ruptures and cultural divisions between community leaders, between those who accept and those who oppose their influence.
Equally as worrying, the growing borderlands insecurity has dire consequences for refugees fleeing Venezuela, of which 1.7 million have already settled in Colombia. Due to the closures of formal border crossings because of the COVID-19 pandemic, those fleeing have been condemned to use illegal crossings known as ‘trochas’, through which they are subjected to far greater insecurity. Bram explains that the border closures also immediately threaten the livelihoods of border populations who depend on informal cash-based jobs, and has drawn lines between local communities, kinship, and trade, thus obligating people to take control of the border themselves.
Consequently, people-smuggling has become far more lucrative for armed groups, and border crossings much more dangerous for migrants, as they become exposed to sexual exploitation, and armed groups wipe out people’s savings through extortion. It is immensely difficult to quantify the number of sexually abused victims as the authorities are rarely willing or able to track victims, and victims are often afraid to speak out, but sources suggest it is a highly common occurrence.
Additionally, criminal networks are increasingly using minors to earn money. An ICG report worryingly indicates that “parents rent out their children for the day to criminal groups and receive about 10,000 Colombian pesos (close to US$2.80), plus an additional average of 5,000 pesos (US$1.30) in earnings”, sometimes with children being raped.
Despite harsh conditions, close to 500,000 Venezuelans have chosen to stay in the Colombian borderlands to stay closer to home, or due to a lack of resources. In a region permeated by poverty and insecurity,the presence of Venezuelan refugees has increased xenophobia and labour tensions– namely, in Villa de Rosario, where 36,605 Venezuelan migrants reside alongside the 90,000 inhabitants.
As a result, the frictions between local communities, intractable violence, and deepening humanitarian crisis is creating “a human security calamity” along the Colombia-Venezuela border. As communities are victimised and insecurity looms, the volatile situation could spark confrontation and conflict at any point through miscalculation and misjudgement. Actions must quickly be taken to de-escalate the growing risks in the region and improve the safety of both indigenous groups and refugees alike.
What are the ways forward?
Hopeful developments have unfolded since April 2021 with the Maduro government indicating a willingness to negotiate with the opposition led by Juan Guaidó, in exchange for relief from US sanctions. For example, the Venezuelan government allowed the World Food Programme (WFP) to begin operating, released 6 U.S. Venezuelan oil executives to house arrest, and backed the legislature’s selection of an electoral commission with 2 of 5 rectors from the opposition. Moreover, on 11 May Maduro appeared to agree to Guaidó’s calls for a resumption of Norway-led negotiations which were suspended in September 2019 for failing to reach any agreement.
With Maduro seemingly more open to international negotiation, a prime opportunity has arisen wherein the de-escalation of the growing risks in the border region could be reached. The Duque administration must therefore re-evaluate their approach to Venezuela and show a willingness to re-establish diplomatic ties and a line of communication to prevent the situation from deteriorating. Diplomatic deadlock only further increases the risk of misinformation and miscalculation, which may escalate conflicts between armed groups and state forces over the control of illicit economies.
As Ebus suggested in an interview with CYIS, an immediate first step is to establish a line of communication between both governments, which should be complemented by creating a joint method to monitor the border as soon as possible, which could entail resolving incidents using international auspices. Following the open letter to the UN from civil society organisations on the ground, it is recommended to bring a UN Envoy to the region, to monitor border incidents and provide transparent, open information about what is occurring on both sides of the border to paint a clearer picture and more effectively inform policy on both sides.
With the WFP being granted access to commence operations in Venezuela, small steps are being made to help alleviate the unfolding humanitarian crisis. Moreover, the gradual re-opening of the border which commenced on June 2, may help relieve some suffering of refugees previously forced to pursue illegal crossings. Whilst these steps mark a positive step in reducing suffering, it is essential for the international community to hike up the amount of humanitarian aid to Venezuela. Currently, only 6.2% of the Venezuelan Regional Response Plan has been funded for 2021. This dramatic shortfall in funds prevents the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies from providing much needed aid. Moreover, in border areas, charities and UN agencies must be able to move more freely to distribute aid, even if having to negotiate access to remote areas with armed groups. Increasing humanitarian aid is an essential first step to protecting borderland residents and refugees from a worsening ordeal.
Finally, it must be remembered that these border issues aren’t new, they are the result of decades of state-neglect. The Colombian government must therefore fulfil their promises of the 2016 Peace Deal to bring education, healthcare and alternative livelihoods to the border regions, so armed groups cannot capitalise on insecurity and vacuums of power. Development pathways are therefore the best way to combat –in the long term– the compounding issues of poverty, conflict, and deteriorating health crises to foster long-term peace and security and offer the people in these areas a chance for a better life.
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