More than two decades after the armed conflict in Kosovo, the vehicle license plate dispute between Serbia and Kosovo escalated rapidly in late September and brought the two sides at the forefront of the European media, which had shifted its focus on the region due to the EU – Western Balkans Summit 2021 on October 6. The license plates dispute has brought to the surface the underlying tensions between the two countries, even though an agreement was reached back in 2011. The deteriorating Kosovo-Serbia relations remind us all that their dispute is not buried in the past and sets broader questions about what should be done to prepare the two sides for meaningful reforms, which will bring them closer to solving their dispute.
Tracing the History of the Vehicle License Plate Dispute
In December 2010, two years after the declaration of independence, the Republic of Kosovo introduced its vehicle license plates which contained the initials RKS (Republic of Kosovo). In turn, Serbia, which does not recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence of 2008, consequently also refused to recognise the new vehicle license plates. In 2011 the two states came to a ten year bilateral agreement, which among other things specified that Serbia would recognise only the plates with KS (Kosovo) initials and their holders would freely enter the Serbian territory. Citizens of Kosovo with RKS plates were instructed to replace their plates at the Serbian borders with temporary ones.
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On September 9, 2021, Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi declared that Kosovo will not extend the temporary above-mentioned agreement and starting from September 15, will only accept vehicle license plates containing the initials RKS. Additionally, Pristina requested that all vehicles under Serbian plates entering the territory of Kosovo would have to purchase temporary Kosovo plates. As a result ethnic minority Serbs who populate the northern part of Kosovo protested against the new measures and blocked two crossing points at Jarinje and Brnjak, while Kosovo placed its police forces on the border in order to maintain stability and put into effect the new license plate order. In return, Serbia deployed its heavy military forces, sent tanks to its borders and began flying MiG jet fighters, reminding the wider international community that the past relations between the two states have not been forgotten.
The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić described Kosovo’s attempt to introduce a similar license plate policy with that of Serbia’s as a “criminal action”. He warned that Serbia will not tolerate any possible ‘pogroms’ against Serbs who live in Kosovo, and will react with appropriate means if necessary. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) immediately deployed its troops to patrol the northern borders in order to de-escalate the tension, while the European Union (EU) urged both parties to join the table of negotiations and on September 30, Miroslav Lajčák, the EU Special Envoy, announced on Twitter that the two opposing sides had reached a deal. The latter mainly stated that following October 2, NATO peacekeepers would replace the police forces and on October 4 a “temporary” sticker regime would come into force.
How can the EU Revamp its Role as a Broker in the Dispute?
Both Kosovo and Serbia have been in EU-led negotiations since 2011. Studies have shown that the dispute between the two countries is following a negative trend and is not nearing any resolutions. This is mainly due to issues of sovereignty and the loss of the appeal the EU integration presents towards the region, even though the President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen declared at the EU - Western Balkans Summit of 2021 that the “EU is not complete without the Western Balkans''. In this state, the EU will never be complete if Brussels does not decide to take a more active role in the region. The vehicle license plate dispute which derives directly from the underlying differences of the two countries, presents a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ opportunity for the EU to overhaul its diplomatic engagement in the region.
The Way Forward
In the wake of the licence plate dispute, there are two possible pathways that can pave the ground for the normalization of relations between the two countries. The first would be that of least resistance, which will temporarily maintain a regionally fragile peace, but is also projected to prolong the skirmishes between the Ethnic Serbs of Kosovo and Pristina, thus adding more fuel to the hardline attitude of Belgrade. As mentioned earlier, Serbia did not hesitate to demonstrate to Kosovo its military superiority. Thus, the second pathway, that of the path of most resistance, will require the employment of an active third party “[b]e they individuals, representatives of states, or international institutions,” which is accepted by both sides, who will function as a mediator between both Serbia and Kosovo and offer them certain deadlines and a number of possible sustainable solutions. Among the solutions, the recognition of Kosovo is the central condition that the European Commission requires, and even though the political imaginary of Belgrade publicly denies such a possibility, there is realistically no other path for them to access the EU. From a broader perspective there is already a precedent of peaceful reconciliation to long standing disputes in the Balkans, drawing from the example of the Prespa Agreement of 2018 between Greece and North Macedonia.The initiator of such an approach can be the EU which will task the broker of this permanent deal to provide solutions for:
Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence;
A solution to issues of insecurity between the two entities;
Guarantees and promotion of minority rights;
Some form of transitional justice.
One thing is clear: the current political tensions are progressively reflected in all possible fields. Just recently, on October 24, a national boxing team for Kosovo was reportedly refused entry to Serbia by Serbian authorities for the Men’s World Boxing Championship of 2021. Accordingly, they were asked to participate in the championships in Belgrade without showing their national symbols, and were turned away at the border on three separate occasions, including after removing their uniforms. Although the European Commission has called for the depoliticisation of sports, this was not the first time Serbia appeared reluctant to permit any sporting engagements with Kosovo that could signal the de facto recognition of the latter.
Theoretically, the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia will take years to evolve into a final and binding agreement between the two sides. In the meantime, a number of important obstacles will surface from the progress of Serbia and Kosovo relations and the EU will have to find tangible solutions. It is certain that two major international powers, namely China and Russia, will block any attempts for Kosovo to gain wider international recognition and access international institutions such as the UN. On the other hand, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Spain, which until today have not recognised Kosovo, will veto its EU and NATO accession procedure. This mediation attempt will require surgical precision both between the two parties involved and also for the wider international community, but it is the only way forward for both countries.
References:
Hartwell, L., (2021). “The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?” CEPA. 1-34.
Bercovitch., J. (1985). “Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations.” Volume 40, Issue 4. 736-752.
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